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NOTE AND COMMENT
Dxcpim OFFEikiN CONVEYANCE op F6OEIN
Review, Prof. Willard Barbour discussed
the question indicated by the above title. His cbnclusions may be-briefly
slated as follows: that such a decree of a competent court having jurisdiction of the person of the defendant creates a personal obligation upon the
defendant which a court of equity at the situs should enforce just as it
w9uld a contract or trust concerning this land made in the foreign jurisdiction: and that, as between the States of this Union. the "full faith and
credit" clause of the Constitution makes such enforcement of the 'foreign
decree obligatory. He conceded that, upon the authorities," these points are
,still open to debate, but he -showed that the tendency of the law, through the
EVVC AT THE SITUS Pxr, OF A
LAN.-In a recent article in this

course of several centuries, has been obviously in the direction of these

conclusions, that the negative authorities are in the nature of a survival in
part of doctrines long since abandoned, and that the distinctions upon which
the survival restsre without logic or good sense. "Extra-territorial Effect
.of the Equitable Decree," 17 MICH. L. Rzv. 527.
A recent decision of the Supreme Court of Iowa gives aid and comfort
to Mr. Barbour's thesis. In a suit for divorce in the state of Washington, the
court, upon granting divorce, ordered the husband to convey to the wife
his land in Iowa. The defendant evaded the process of the court and, in
Iowa, conveyed the land to one who had notice of the Washington decree.
Upon suit brought in Iowa against the husband and his grantee, the court
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set aside the conveyance and ordered the husband to convey to the wife.
both siiits, perso'nal jurisdiction of the husband was obtained, and, in the
for the
Iowa court, of the grantee also. In both states, the statutes provided
allocation of the property of parties to a divorce suit. Matson v. Matson,
173 N. W. 127.
This case clearly proceeds in the main, upon the principles urged by Mr.
Barbour, and is inconsistent with what has usually been regarded as the doctrine of Bullock v. Bullock, 52 N. J.Eq. 561, Fall v. Fall, 75 Neb. io4, and
Fall v. Eastin, 215 U. S. x. But, with what may be considered commendable
conservatism, the court avoids criticism of those cases by distinguishing them,
upon points which were given more or less emphasis by those courts, but with
which Mr. Barbour did not concern himself. It thus pronounceb; a doctrine
somewhat more limited than that advanced by the article in this review, and
it seems well worth while to consider the validity of these distinctions and
limitations.
Fall v. Fall and Fall v. Eastin are distinguished in that the husband was
first
not served with process in the second suit. But, if the decree in the
grantet
his
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took with notice of this obligation, a 'court of equity acquiring jurisdiction
obligation,
that
of
fulfillment
in
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him
compel
should
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even though it fails to acquire jurisdiction of the husband. Any other position violates the well settled and highly politic principles of equity concerning
the
notice. Probably no one would question this position so far as concerns
squarely
falls
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the
of
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The
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or
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save in a
under the same equitable principles and is not to be distinguished
had
court
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where
Eastin,
v.
Fall
in
thrt
true
is
It
wholly artificial way.
"full
only to consider the constitutional question, Justice Holmes says that the
of
faith and credit" clau~e does not require any state to apply the doctrines
parties.
notice but only to recognize the effect of judgments upon the immediate
rules
But, without inquiring whether a merely colorable departure from the
of notice should be held an effective evasion of the Constitution, it is clear
that a violation of sound and settled rules of equity is not condoned by showing that it is not also a violation of the Constitution.
A second distinction raises a more serious question. All three of the cases
cited are distinguished in that the statutes of the state where the land lay
did not provide for the division of the property of the parties to a divorce
suit. To this line of distinction two objections lie. In the first place, it violates
the principle that the merits of a foreign judgment or decree, assuming that
the court had jurisdiction, cannot be inquired into. See 17 MIcu. L. Rzv. 545,
to be
546. In the second place, even if the merits of the former decree are
,examined, its merits are not impugned by showing that the courts at the
situs have no power to make a similar decree. It would. seem self evident
dethat the power of a court to impose a personal obligation upon a party
which
principle
same
the
pended solely upon the law of its own state-upon
makes the effect to be given to such obligation in another state depend upon
the law of that other state and the United States Constitution. The question
here seems to be entirely free from the difficulties which surround the ques-
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tion as to what law governs the formation of contracts and trusts of foreign
land.' Thus, as to the fundamental doctrine of the principal case, that the
foreign decree created a personal obligation upon the husband, .it seems
nqt to matter at all whether the local court could have made a similar decree.
Then the .question remains whether the propriety (or duty, under the Constitution) of recognizing and enforcing the obligation of the foreign decree
is affected by the existence or non-existence of power in the local court to
make a similar decree.' The answer, unless we are willing to accept merely
arbitrary distinCtions, is negative. There is no safer generalization in the
field of conflict of laws than this: that all obligations created abroad should
be enforced, regardless of whether similar obligations might have been similarly created under the law of the forum, unless in particular cases where
their ehforcement'is contrary to the policy of the forum. That there is no
policy opposed to the acceptance of such foreign decrees as we are considering, is demonstrated by Mr. Barbour, who calls attention to the fact that
an- such policy would be equally violated by acceptance of a deed executed
under compulsion of the foreign court-which latter form of indirect acceptance of the foreign decree has never been refused. 17 MicH. L. RFv. 549.
It is submitted that the distinctions attempted in the principal case are
untenable, and must go the way of the other "diversities," parcel of the conservative doctrine, which are rejected by the court in reaching its decision.
E. N. D.
DEERMINABL FZZ-Possm iTY oil IZ vER.-Professor Gray, in the
first edition of his great work, "The Rule Against Perpetuities," Section 31
and following, contended that the Statute Quia Emptores by putting an end
to tenure between feoffor and feoffee of an estate in fee simple, incidentally
put an end to possibility of reverter to the feoffer on failure of the condition in a determihable fee. Specifically he says that upon dissolution of
an eleemosynary corporation a terminable gift to such corporation does not
revert to the donor, as is said by Lord Coke, Co. Lir. I3b, but eschewts.
For reversion depends on tenure, and the Statute by destroying tenure ends
possibility of reverter. In his third edition, Section 4oa, he notes that since the
second edition of his book three cases have held contra;--North v. Graham.
235 Ill. 178, Pond v. Douglass, Io6 Me. 85, and Board of Chosen Freeholders
v. Buck, 779 N. J. Eq. 472. These follow a dictuin in First Universalist Society
v. Boland, 155 Mass. 171, which" he considers as opposed tQ a case not to be

distinguished from it, the leading case of Brattle Square Church v. Grant,
3 Gray i42. The learned author regafds Lord Coke's statement that land of
a corporation upon its dissolution reverted to the donor or grantor, while upon
the death of a natural person without heirs his land escheated, as based on
cases which do not uphold him, and the rule as not surviving his retirement,
for Johnson v. Norwai Winch 37, 1622, shows a great doubt on the part 'of
the judges, and thoigh the report does not give the final decision on the'
point, Lord Hale's MSS. cited Co. Li-Tr. I3b, Harg. note, say they held the
land escheated. Lord Coke seems to have but a dictun in one case to support
him, and only one'case that has ever followed it, GRAY Section 51.
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In section 5Ia, of the third edition Professor Gray remarks that the only
case that has ever been decided in accordance with Lord Coke's remark is
289. "This case, as a deMott v. Danville Seminary, 129 Ill. 403, 136 Ill.
cision, stands alone." This was true when the second edition of the RUzLE
AGAiNST PERPzs'zui-s appeared, but not in 1915 when the third edition came
out. By this time, in addition to the cases cited by Professor Gray, approving
the doctrine that there was possibility of reverter to the donor in case of a
215
terminable gift to a charity, Presbyterian Church v. Venable, 159 Ill.
(1896), Miller v. Riddle, 227 Ill. 53, cases which he regarded as not actually
decided on that point though it certainly seems to be involved in the latter,
there was the further Illinois case cited by Professor Gray at Section 40 a,
i78 (i9o8), which notices and
but not at 5Ia, of North v. Graham, 235 Ill.
rejects as against the great weight of authority the view of Professor Gray.
It was -therefore not "the only case' when the third edition appeared. The
misstatement is due to the fact that Section 5Ia was taken over without
change from the second edition while 4oa appeared for the first time in the
third edition.
In his work on FuTURz INTERESTS, Professor Kales thinks it a matter of

surprise that the Illinois Supreme Court in the Danville Seminary Case should
have overlooked the masterly presentation of the matter by Professor Gray,
and ruled contra, but accounts for it by the suggestion that the rule adopted
by the court seemed a jast one. The land having been originally donated for a
purpose, and that purpose having failed, it seems more just that the land
revert to the heirs of the donor than escheat to the state. That this may be
the correct explanation is borne out by more recent cases. In Hart v. Lake,
273 Il. 6o, (i916), Mott v. Danville Seminary, supra, is again cited with approval, though the claimant is denied the aid of equity to enable him to recover the reverted property. 'But in County of Franklin v. Blake, 283 Ill. 292
(i918), the court refuses to recognize possibility of reverter in the case
of land purchased, not donated, for a charitable purpose, and on the distinct
ground that "where the owner donates land to iid a corporation organized for
a charitable or public purpose to carry out its objects, when the corporation
ceases to carry out the purposes of the organization and has no further use
for the land it is reasonable and just that it should revert to the 'donor, but
when land is bought by such corporation and its value paid the owner, we
can see no more reason why it shoud revert to the grantor than land purchased by a trading corporation", which all agree does not revert, but on
dissolution of the corporation is to be divided amofig the stockholders. However, this seems to prove too much, for the law knows no such distinction
between land kranted and land donated to a trading corporation, and in logic
the same follows in case of benevolent corporations. At all events the Illinois court holds that on the equities of the case, on the justice, but hardly
-the reason of the case, the donated lands of a dissolved eleemosynary corporation revert to the donor, while the granted lands do not revert to the
grantor, but go to the members or their representatives who put their money
into the buildings and work of the corporation, or, those failing, escheat to
the state. The court relies on McAlhany v. Murray, 89 S. C. 44o, annotated
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in Ann. Cas. 1913 A ioi2, and in io MXcH. L. Rzv. 121, as "an able and log-

ical" discussion of the law. Strangely enough this case, though going on
the justice of the case, rejects the Illinois view of revetter to the donor; and
makes no distinction between donor and grantor, and this in face of the very
clear previous expressions of the South Carolina court contra. The case
contains an excellent discussion and review of the authorities, and rejects
Lord Coke's rule.
Finally it may be noted that none of these cases is decided on the legal
reason as distinguished from the equitable juitice, of the matter. They do
not discuss Professor Gray's thesis that a reversionary right implies tenure,
and that the Statute Quia Emptores by ending tenure between foeffer and
foeffee of a fee simple incidentally ended all possibility of reverter to donor
or grantor, and hence all determinable- fees. Thus a late English
case, Hastings Corp; v. Letton (19o8), i K. B.. 378, makes no distinction
between lease for years and fee simple. The statute applied only to
fee simple estates. If the Statute had that effect then, except in Pennsylvania and South Car6lina where tenure exists and the Statute Quia Emptores
is not in force, determinable fees with their possibility of reverter are, on
reason, extinct, whatever the justice of the case. Their absurdity in the ease
of trading corporations long ago led the courts to legislate them oui of existence without waiting for any statute. See the interesting discussion in Richards v. Coal and Mining Co. (igog), 221 Mo. I49. And it is precisely in
South Carolina where they might in reason be still in foice that the latest
pronouncement of the highest court is against them on the grounds of justice and equity. A short, but interesting, discussion of the soundness of Professor Gray's position may be read in the review of the first edition of his
book on the Rumx AGAINST PRPTUTIEMS in 2 LAW QUART. IZV. 394, and in a
resulting discussion by Professor Gray and Mr. Challis, .two masters in real
property law, in 3 LAw QUART. RZv. 399, 403. On the whole Professor Gray
seems to have the better of the argument and the worst of the decisions.
and it is perhaps well that it is so. To-base our modem rule as to disposition of the land, of a dissolved corporation upon a statute of 129o, and an
ancient, though not extinct, concept of tenure, certainly seems undesirable
if-the result violates our sense of reason and justice. It seems better to distribute such property to those equitably entitled on the facts of each-case.
Failing any such parties, escheat to the statp is.-jist. See io MicH. L. Rv.
121.

E. C. G.

EUvDENC-PmsuMPToN" QF LvGrrIMAcY.-The present-day status of the
old common law rule aimed at preventing impeachment of the legitimacy of
children born in wedlock, is presented by the opinion in Re McNamaras"
Estate,-and McNamara v. McNamara et al, 183 Pac. 552.
The case involved the question of whether the son of Mrs. B. was legitimate, and therefore entitled to inherit from her husbaid. The son was born
to Mrs. B. on the 24th of October, 1914. Mrs. B.'had left her husaanf- on.
the 24th of December, 1913, and had not seen him in the interim under circumstances permitting intimacy between them.

NOTB AND COMMENT
The court, after finding under the rule of judicial notice, that it was possible for a child to have been conceived on a particular date and not be born
until ten calendar months later, (the period involved in this case), then decided that whether the child was that of the husband, or of another with
whom Mrs. B. cohabited from the time of leaving her husband on the 23rd
of December, 1913, until after the child was born, was a question of fact to
be determined upon evidence submitted, with the presumption obtaining that
because the child was born in wedlock, he was legitimate; a presumption not
conclusive, but disputable.
A dissenting opinion was filed by Melvin, J., stating the rule to be, "if
it appears, that by the laws of nature, it is possible that the husband is the
father, that is, if it appears that the husband had intercourse with the mother
during the period of possible conception, legitimacy is conclusively presumed".
The judges were in accord upon the -proposition that such intercourse would
be presumed up to the time of the separation.
There is little doubt that the rule as first formulated in English law, was
one which conclusively presumed that a child born in wedlock was legitimate,
and permitted no evidence to the contrary, except it were offered to prove
either impotency of the husband or, that during the period of possible conception the husband was "beyond the four seas." Reg. v. Murrey, i Salk. i2.
A line of more recent important decisions, however, has established in
England a doctrine less restricted and to the effect that "the presumiition
of legitimacy arising from the birth of a child during wedlock, the husband
not being found to be impotent, and having opportunities of access to
his wife during the period in which a child could be begotten and born in
the course" of nature, may be rebutted by circumstances indicating a contrary
presumption." Banbury Peerage Case, i Sim. & Stu., 153. The doctrine of
this case was followed in Head v. Head, i Sim. & Stu., 15o and Burnaby v.
Ballie, L. R. 42, Ch. Div. 297.
A reasonable construction and weighing of autorities in this. country
would seem to justify the following conclusions as to the state of the law
upon this subject here.
(a) The presumption 6f legitimacy obtains in all cases where -the child
is born in wedlock, but this presumption is regarded, not as conclusive, but
may not show absolute impossias rebuttable by evidence which, though itbility of parentage by. the husband, yet clearly and satisfactorily shows parentage by another.
(b) This rule is not to be construed as giving*,opportunity for conclusion against legitimacy where the potent husband and his wife were living
together, br where reasonable opportunity of access was afforded, during
the period when conception probably occurred, though the wife may have
been living continuously in adulterous relations with another during the same
period.
A reasonable conflict in the evidence upon a question of negligence will
carry the case to the jury. Not so with the issue of parentage. The status
of legitimacy or illegitimacy is regarded as too important to be overcome
by a mere preponderance of evidence. Scott v. Hillenburg, 85 Va. 245;
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Canaan v. Avery, 72 N. H. 591; Grant v. Mitchell, 83 Me. 23; Metheny v.
Bohn, i6o I1. 267; State v. McDowell, iio N. C. 734.
(c) The circumstance that the conception must have been ante-nuptial,
does not alter the rule. Wallace v. Wallace, 137 Ia. 37; Dennison v. Page,
2.9Pa. 42o; Zachman v. Zachtnan, 201 Ill.
380.
BoYcoT-MxpIcAL AssocrATioN.-The opinion of &fCardie,J., (without
a jury), in Pratt v. British Medical Association (igig), I K. B. 244, (noted
ii the MICHIGAN LAw Rzvrw, June, i919, p. 704), brilliantly reviewing the
English cases, merits a fuller statement of the facts and principles involved
than was possible in a short note.
The action was by Doctors Burke, Pratt, and Holmes, against the British
Medical Association and four of its officers, for damages for conspiracy,
slander and libel.
The Medical Association was incorporated in 1874, "to promote the medical and allied sciences, and to maintain the honour and interests of the medical profession," with the incidental power to carry out these objects. Any
registered medical practitioner was eligible to membership, and large numbers of the physicians (more than 50 per cent in the Midland Counties) of
England were. members; and through its rules and regulations administered
by its Council and Ethical Committee, it exerted a powerful influence throughout and beyond the United Kingdom. The members were formed in geographical divisions, composed of those" in a particular district, free to govern
themselves and make such rules as they deemed expedient, subject to the
approval of the Council of the Association.. Coventry constituted one division, and a majority of the doctors in this district were members.
In Coventry there had existed for more than eighty years the Coventry
Provident Dispensary for securing medical attendande for its 20,000 members
and their families, each member paying four shillings, annually, making an
income of £4,ooo, half of which was expended for drugs, druggists and management, the other half going to the doctors constituting the medical staff.
In I9o6 a controversy arose between the then medical staff of the Dispensary and the managing committee, and all of the staff resigned. The Committee then invited Doctor Burke, who resided in the Birmingham district,
to become a member of the medical staff. He was registered in 1895, and
became a member of the Medical Association in i9o3. He accepted the call
and in June, 1907, moved into Coventry with his family and took up his
duties as medical officer of the Dispensary.
In i9o4 the Medical Association ptiblished "model rules" for divisions
(which were adopted by the Coventry division) providing that- "no member
shall, except in circumstances of great urgency, meet in consultation, or hold
any professi6nal relations, with a midical practitioner who shall have been
declared by a resolution of the division, if a member, to have broken 'the
rules, or if not a member, to have acted, (after due notice) in contravention
of the rules, or who,- whether a member or not shall fiave beefi declared by
the division to have been deemed guilty of conduct detrimental to the honour
and interests of the profession." In April, i9o6, the Coventry division re-
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solved that no member should associate himself with the Coventry Dispensary.
In the same year the Medical Association promulgated another model rule
(adopted by Coventry division in January, i9o7), to the effect that whenever
any division passes a resolution declaring the conduct of any medical practitioner detrimental to the honour and interests o, the division, the matter
shall be reported to the Central Ethical Committee, and if approved by it,
or if not, if passed by a three-fourths vote 6f those present at a special meeting of the division called to consider the matter, formal notice may be sent
to every member of the division that "in the opinion of the division the conis detrimental to the honour and interests of the
duct of Doctor
medical profession;" and likewise, if thought necessary, like notices may be
sent to the members of other divisions.
Doctor Burke received his call to the Dispensary Staff in May, 19o7; May
26, he was notified he would be boycotted under the above rules, if he accepted. He accepted and took up his duties in June; June 2o the division
passed a resolution condemning his conduct; July 16 it resolved he had violated the rules, and the resolution of April, I9o6, in accepting the call; July
20, it notified him and asked an explanation; he replied July 29, that he was
satisfied with his new position; he was then warned that he would be expelled; August 28, the Executive Committee of the division resolved to ostracise Doctor Burke, "and make the ostracism as complete as possible";
September 3, the division recommended to the Council of the Association*that
he be expelled; this was communicated to the Birmingham division, September 4; December 18, he was cited to appear before the Ethical Committee, and
was expelled February 13, i9o8. Notices of this action furnished by the Association. were then sent by the Coventry division to each of its members,
and to those of the eight surrounding divisions, each of which had -similar
rules, making it a breach of duty for any doctor to meet Doctor Burke in
consultation or give him any professional recognition, except at the risk of
expulsiorr or censure and for more than ten years, Doctor Burke was, with
a single exception, unable to secure any consultation .among the doctors in
these districts; his private practice was-greatly injured, and he and his family
were treated as social and professional outcasts. Doctor Pratt, a member of
the Medical Association, and Doctor Holmes, who was not, joined the Coventry Dispensary. Staff in 1913, and were thereafter treated as Doctor Burke
had been. The boycott was further emphasized by the "black list" published
each week in the British Medical Jourhal by the defendants. The only
charges against either of the plaintiffs was that they accepted and held appointments on the Dispensary Staff, a highly respectable and well managed
institution, which gave them ample remuneration, adequate leisure, full opportunity for private practice, and a right to claim and exert all the honourable requirements of professional men. The only interest affected was the
pecuniary interest of the Coventry doctors.
The court concluded that the notices sent were intended to and did operate
coercively; were, and were meant to be, threats; were intended to disturb
and intimidate each doctor who received them; back of them was the whole
power of the British Medical Association; they were emphasized by the pub-
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lished "black list;" the threat of ruin was the very point and object of the
scheme; whether the dffending doctor was a member or not, the doom was
the same for all who met or recognized a Coventry Dispensary doctor; it was
a prolonged, deliberate and pitiless boycott; the intimidation was a general,
effective, and continuous fear of expulsion, or ostracism, or both, involving
the destruction of professional repute.
The plaintiffs claimed this was an actionable conspiracy; and the defendants contended that the acts and threats were within the limits of their
legal rights.
As to conspiracy. This is not important, except as an aid in the proof,
or to enhance damage, in any agreement to commit any of the well-known
species of tort, including knowingly procuring a breach of contract. In such
cases one can commit the tort as well as many. Lumley v. Gye [1853],
2 E. & B. 216; Quinn V. Leathem [1goi], A. C. 495, 5io; South Wales M. F.
v. Glamorgan Co. [igo5], A. C. 239; but it seems to have been considered of
importance in the cases where courts undertake to protect a man in the lawful exercise of his calling. These usually arise from molestation by a combination of persons, since molestation by one person only is usually very
slight; and s9me cases use conspiracy as if it made that which is lawful, if
done by one, actionable if done by several in combination. It is necessary
therefore to ascertain the principles involved in Quinn v. Leathem [igoi],
A. C. 495. THese are: A has a right to deal with B, if he is willing to deal
with A; but this right of A is nugatory, unless B is at liberty to deal with A,
if he choose. There is therefore a correlative duty on everyone, as C, not
to interfere with this liberty of B, except so far as C's own liberty. of action
justifies. So C's interference with B's liberty to deal with A affects A. If
this is justifiable, A has no redress; if wrongful, ordinirily, B only can sue,
since his liberty is immediately affected and A's damage is too remote; but
if C's interference is wrongful, and intended to, and does, damage A, that is,
if A is wrongfully and intentionally struck at and damaged through B, such
damage is not too remote, or unforseen, but is the direct and intended resuit; this may be done by one; it requires no combination of persons. If C
inflicts damage bn A, by a threat of personal violence to B, who wishes to
deal with A, and he abstains because of C's threat, and A is thereby damaged,
C's act'is actionable by A. Garret v. Taylor (x62o), Cro. Jac. 567; Tarleton
v. M'Gawley (1794), Peake N. P. C. 27o; Giblan v. Nati. Amal. Lab. U.
[1903], 2 K B. 6oo, 619, 62o. A!lle* v. Flood [I8981, A. C. i, does not con-

flict with this, for there was no intimidation, coercion, or threats there.
"In my opinion," says the judge, "the rule of law is reasonably clear that
a single person or a body of persons will commit an actionable wrong if he
or they inflict actual pecuniary damage upon another by the intentional employment of unlawful means to injure that person's business, even though "the
unlawful means may not comprise any specific act which is per se actionable."
But what is "unlawful means"? This perhaps is not susceptible of exhaustive definition. Personal violence (Tarleton v. M'Gawley); threats of
personal violence (Garret v. Taylor; Keeble v. Hickeringill (i7o6), ix East
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576 n); nuisance, (Lyons v. Wilkins [1899], I Ch. 255); fraud, (National
Phonograph Co. v. Edison Bell &c. Co. [igo8], i Ch. 335), are unlawful
means. Iii Quinn v. Leathem [IgO9], A. C. 495, the only threat was, not of
personal violence, to a customer that his servants would be directed to cease
working-for him, if he continued to deal with the plaintiff. See also Giblan's
Case [19o3], 2 K. B. 6oo, and Conway v. Wade [xgo9], A. C. 5o6. "I can
draw no distinction between a threat to cause a strike and a threat to inflict
upon a man the slur of professional dishonour," says the court.
There is a difference between a warning and a threat, which is one of
fact; the threat involves intimidation and coercion, of some kind. It is in
respect to the coercion involved in threats that combination and conspiracy
are important. A wrongful act of one may be easily resisted, but not that
of many; a combination not to work is lawful, but a combination to prevent
others from working is not; not to work oneself is lawful, but to order others
who wish to work not to do so is different; a threat by a union to an employer to call his union employees out, who are willing to work, is a form
of coercion, intimidation, "molestation, and annoyance which" is difficult to
resist, and requires justification.
Justification has been discussed in the cases for wrongfully inducing a
breach of contract with the following :esult: "No one can legally excuse
himself to a man, of whose contract he has procured the breach, on the
ground that he acted on a wrong understanding of his rights, or without
malice, or bona fide, or in the best interest of himself, nor even that he acted
as an altruist seeking only the good of another and careless of his own advantage,"-Read v. Friendly Soc. &c. [I9b2], 2 I. B. 88, 96, 97, 732, 737;
Glamorgan Coal Case [19o], A. C. 230; Smithies Case [igoo], i K. B. 310.
No different rule can exist where an injury to another's trade has been
caused by such unlawful means as threats, intimidation, or violence, although
no b:'each of contract has been caused thereby, and self interest is not a justification. To hold otherwise would negative the decisions from Garret v;
Taylor in i62o, to Quinn v. Leathem in igo.z
Malice. It is sometimes said Inalice is essential to the action. This is a
word of uncertain meaning. It is frequently used merely in a formal sense,
as in libel where no question of privilege can arise. Here it is only an epithet or legal ekpression without real significance. This can be put aside.
Reg. v. Munslow [i895], i Q. B. 758; Abrath'v. N. E. Ry. [1886], ix App.
Cas. 247, 253.
It is however used, to indicate an actual state of mind, which appears to
be of two kinds: spite and ill will; and also-an indirect, wrong, corrupt, or
unlawful motive, or an unjustifiable intention to inflict injury. Dickson v.
Earl of Wilton (1859), -xF. & F. 419, 427; Turnbull v. Bird (1861), 2 F. &
F. 5o8, 524; Browne v. Dunn (1893), 6 IL 67, 72; Royal Aquarium Case
[1892], 1 Q. B. 431; Stuart v. Bell [i891], 2 Q. B. 341, 351; Clark v. Molyneux (1877), 3 Q. B. D. 237, 247; Mitchell v. Jenkins (1833), 5 B. & Ad. 588.
Actual malice, in the sense indicated in these decisions is not an essential
element in the present case. If the plaintiff proves damage caused by such
illegal means as violence or threats he has established all the law requires.
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But if an appellate court should hold otherwise, then the court felt compelled
to say the evidence shows in this case that the defendant doctors were angrily
hostile to plaintiffs, unceasingly bitter toward them, sought every opportunity
to humiliate them, and admittedly wished to render their lives unbearable
and not only to punish, but to ruin them. This constituted' actual malice
.on their part if any is necessary.
But it was contended that the defendant Medical Association could not
have such malice. It was admitted that the acts of its agents in this case
fell within the scot'e of their authority. It is now settled that a master, corporate or not, may be liable for the actual malice of his servant, since such
a state of mind rests on the same juristic footing as any other state of mind,
and in appropriate cases the servant's state of mind is imputed to his principal. This is true in libel: Citizens' Life Ins. Co. v. Brown [1904], A. C:
423," CLSRK AND LINDSaLL, Torts, p. 64, (6th Ed.) ; Phil. W. & B. R. Co. v.
Quigley (1858), 21 How. (U. S.) 2o2; and in malicious prosecution: Barwick v. English J. S. Bk. (1867), L. R. 2 Ex.259; Cornford v. Carlton Bank
fI9oo], i Q. B. 22; Lloyd v. Grace & Co. [i912] A. C. 716; Goods.peed V.
East Haddam Bank (853), 22 Conn. 439.
The court also held that rules and regulations were in unlawful restraint
of trade, injurious to the public, and void. Nordenfeldt Case [1894], A. C.
5i5; Russell v. Areal. Soc. [1912]. A. C. 421; Neville v. Dominion &c. Co.
[i915], 3 K. B. s56.
The defendants, although given full opportunity, made no effort to justify
the slander and libel charges. Judgment was rendered for i.ooo in favor of
Doctor Burke, and £7oo to each of the others.
There are numerous American cases, some in conflict, on all the aboye
propositions. In the main, however, the recent American cases, especially
those in the Supreme Court of the United States, and in the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, support the rules above given upon conspiracy,
coercion, threats, intimidation, malice, etc. Some of these are: Angle v.
Chicago &c. R. R. Ca. (1893), 151 U. S. 13, 14 S. Ct. 244; Bjtterman v. Louisville &c. R. R. Co. (1907), 207 U. S. 205, 31 S. Ct. 91, Gompers v. Bucks
S~ove Co. (1910), 221 U. S. 418, 31 S.Ct. 492; Lawler v. Loewe (1915), 235
U. S. 522, 35 S. Ct. 17O; Truax v. Raich (xI95), 239 U. S. 33, 36 S. Ct. 7;
Hitchman Coal &c. Co. v. Mitchell (1917), 245 U, S. 228, 38 S. Ct. 65; Vegelahn v. Guntner (1896), x67 Mass. 92; Martell v. White (i9o4), 185 Mass. 255;
Berry v. Donovan (igo5), 188 Mass. 353; Steinert & Co. v. Tagen (I9iI),
2o7 Mass. 394; Burnham v. Dowd (1914), 217 Mass. 351; Cornellierv. Haverhill Shoe Assn. (1915), 221 Mass. 554; Harvey v. Chapman (1917), 226 Mass.
1pi; Martineau v. Foley (1918), 231 Mass. 220; Smith v. Bowen (1919), 232
Mass. io6; Auburn Draying Co. v. Wardell (1919), 127 N. Y. i. Compare
contra, Macauley Br6s. v. Tierney (1895), i9 R. I. 255; National Protective
Assn. v. Cumming (i9o2), 17o N. Y. 315; Lindsay v. Montana F. of L.
(19o8), 37 Mont. 265; Bossert v. Dhuy (917), 221 N. Y. 342. H. L. W.

